Smart power grids offer to revolutionize power distribution by sharing granular power usage data, though this same data sharing can reveal a great deal about users, and there are serious privacy concerns for customers. In this paper, we address these concerns using differential privacy. Differential privacy is a statistical notion of privacy that adds noise to provide privacy guarantees. One privacy threat is the aggregation of time series data, and we therefore apply a trajectory-level form of differential privacy to guard against such privacy threats. In particular, we consider inputperturbation privacy, which adds noise directly to sensitive data streams before sharing them. We apply it in this work to provide privacy guarantees on an individual basis. We then address the impact of privacy upon two key grid stakeholders: the utility and the accuracy of its analytics of interest, as well as customers and the financial impact upon their utility bills. Both impacts are shown to be modest, even with strong privacy guarantees. Simulation results are provided using actual power usage data, demonstrating the viability of this approach in practice.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the emergence of smart grid technologies has led to a great deal of research in power systems, e.g., [10, 15, 21] . The basic idea underlying smart grids is that smarter sensing technologies can be applied to individual buildings to give more granular power usage data over time. Although these technologies are promising, they implicate significant privacy concerns among users: power usage data gathered in smart grids can be aggregated over time for individuals, and these datasets can be quite revealing [22] .
In this paper, we develop a method for preserving users' privacy while allowing smart grids to function normally. This method sends privatized streams of customers' demand data to the utility company, providing privacy of data in transit and privacy from the utility itself. The goal in this implementation is to enable utility companies to perform in-house or third-party data analytics without revealing sensitive customer data. Common existing approaches to privacy in smart grids include battery-based load hiding methods [5, 23] , which require hardware that not all homes have. Developments in [19] provide information-theoretic privacy guarantees, though that work requires power consumption and to satisfy certain modeling assumptions, which may not always hold. In contrast, this work requires no such assumptions.
Our privacy implementation is built on the framework of differential privacy, and we implement trajectory-level privacy [9, 12] , which protects entire sensitive data streams. This approach is related to the original formulation of differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy that originates in the database literature [4] . However, the trajectory-level approach has the advantage of masking sensitive events that persist over time (i.e., across numerous smart meter samples), rather than merely instantaneous events (captured in a single sample). Smart grid privacy is threatened by time series aggregation, and this trajectory-level approach mitigates this threat.
We consider input perturbation privacy, which directly adds carefully-calibrated noise to sensitive data before sharing it. This approach privatizes all data at the customer's home before it leaves the premises, eliminating the need for a trusted aggregator. Differential privacy is immune to postprocessing, in that performing computations with differentially private data does not weaken its privacy guarantees [4] . An adversary intercepting private data is therefore unable to harm customers' privacy guarantees, regardless of how they process privatized data [12] . To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to implement trajectory-level privacy in the smart grid.
Differential privacy of other forms has been applied in smart power grids previously [2] , and the most relevant works in the literature are [1, 6, 18, 24] . Work in [1, 24] requires the presence of an external battery, which homes may not have. Both [1] and [6] use the infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution to have each agent add gammadistributed noise, leading to differential privacy for aggregated information but not for individuals. In contrast, this paper will provide differential privacy guarantees to all users individually. Homomorphic encryption schemes have also been used [14, 17] , though these methods can be computationally demanding. Encryption methods have also been combined with differential privacy [7] . The approach in this paper can be combined with an encryption method, though our contribution is to differential privacy and this paper therefore focuses on these developments. The results in [18] derive a tradeoff between individuals' privacy and accuracy of state estimation.
In this paper, we derive tradeoffs as well, but directly in terms of the impact upon aggregate demand analysis and user billing. We then characterize the worst-case error for both total power consumption at the network level and billing on the per-customer level. Aggregate power consumption is one common quantity of interest to utility companies. We quantify the average worst-case error in aggregate power consumption as a function of users' privacy levels, providing a direct tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Customer bills already contain uncertainty and are currently computed using estimates of power usage. We address the question of how much additional uncertainty is induced by privacy, and In this work, all privacy noise is added at customers' homes before any data is shared with the utility. Under a mandate of strong user privacy -even from the utility itself -we explore the impact of differential privacy upon aggregate load computations and customer billing.
we give a quantitative answer that bounds the increase in utility bills that consumers should expect. We show that customers should expect only modest increases in costs, even with strong privacy guarantees. The contributions of this paper are therefore the privacy implementation itself, together with statistical bounds on the error it induces in aggregate analytics and customer billing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis of differential privacy's impact upon billing in smart grids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the problems to be solved in this paper. Then, Section 3 provides the necessary background on differential privacy and our implementation of it, as well as technical preliminaries needed in the subsequent analysis. Next, Section 4 bounds the effects of privacy upon aggregate analysis and user billing, and Section 5 provides simulation results to demonstrate these developments on real smart grid data. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks and directions for future research.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we outline the problems that are the focus of the remainder of the paper.
Problem Background and Setup
While smart meters produce several types of data that can be privatized, in this paper we focus on privatizing signals of demand data. Time is measured by a discrete counter, k, which represents sampling continuous-time demand signals with a sampling period ∆t. In this paper we consider time indices k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K } for some K ∈ N. The total number of customers in the region under study is denoted by N ∈ N. Define d i k as the power demand (in kW) of the i th customer at time instant k, for i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N }.
As noted above, we will protect the power demand data of individual customers using differential privacy, and that will require noise to be added to customers' demand signals. The private demand of customer i at time k is denoted bŷ
where w i k is the noise added to provide differential privacy to customer i. The precise distribution of noise will be developed below in Section 3, and here we only introduce the terminology required to state the problems we solve.
We consider a privacy architecture in which noise is added to the data in the smart meter itself. The raw data never leaves the consumer's premises, as shown in Figure 1 . The private data set {d i k } i ∈[N ],k ∈K is available to the utility, which it can release to an in-house or third-party vendor for performing data analytics. This architecture provides strong privacy guarantees to customers because not even the utility company has access to customers' raw power demand data. Motivation for considering this scenario comes from the possibility of mandated privacy rules on smart meter data in the future, much like the European Union's recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 for personal data. Motivation also comes from preventing privacy breaches of sensitive customer data, and, by not sharing raw sensitive data at all, this architecture precludes such breaches. For the customer, a potential cost for such strong privacy is uncertainty in billing. By only sharing privatized demand data, bills must be assessed using noisy data. In fact any data analytics performed with private data will have some amount of error due to privacy noise. We will explore the impact of privacy upon analytics and billing below.
Problem Statements
We focus on two use cases in particular: (i) energy use of a single customer and associated billing considerations, and (ii) aggregate demand of a collection of consumers.
Billing/Energy Use. The main variable in the energy bill a customer receives at the end of a billing period is the total energy used in that period 2 . Let the energy consumed by customer i in the k-th sampling interval be E i k . Let the total energy consumed by customer i in an interval
However, the utility does not have access to this value exactly. Since only private energy data is available to the utility, it instead must bill its customers based on an estimate of the energy computed from the private energy use data. The minimum variance estimator of the total energy consumption of customer i over the interval K , which we call private energy consumption during
A statistical characterization of the errorẼ i K as a function of privacy parameters is desired in order to understand privacy's impact upon billing, and that is the first problem we solve.
Error in the aggregate demand estimate. The aggregate demand d k of a collection of consumers is the sum of demands of individual households at time k:
The private aggregate demandd k is the utility's estimate obtained by using the private data:
which follows from Equation (1). The second problem is to statistically characterize this error and understand its impact upon the utility's analytics.
PRIVACY IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we briefly provide the necessary background on trajectory-level differential privacy, for which a complete exposition can be found in [12] . Then we describe our privacy implementations for d i k . We emphasize that our developments are not on the theory of differential privacy itself, but, instead, are on the application of differential privacy to smart meter data.
Differential Privacy Background
This subsection provides the requisite differential privacy background. We retain the notation typically used in the literature and denote an arbitrary input by u in this subsection. These tools will be applied to d i k specifically below. We first define the spacel p that will contain users' sensitive input signals. User i's input is
Then we definel p := {u i | P T [u i ] ∈ ℓ p for all T ∈ N}, and we have u i ∈l p . In particular, ℓ p ⊊l p , and the spacel p includes signals that do not vanish asymptotically.
For all i ∈ [N ], user i contributes the input signal u i ∈l p to some system. The goal of differential privacy is to make "nearby" input signals produce outputs with similar probability distributions. The notion of "nearby" is formalized through an adjacency relation, defined below.
Differential privacy masks the differences between adjacent inputs. For example, in a smart grid, two demand signals may differ if a home's occupants return from work at a different time, or if they are on vacation for some period of time before resuming normal power usage. The parameter b should be chosen based on the size of difference that a user would like to mask, and larger values of b give greater privacy guarantees because more trajectories must be made approximately indistinguishable. We note that this choice of adjacency pertains to single customers, which differs from adjacency relations used for trajectories in [9, 12] .
Differential privacy concerns the probability distributions of outputs that correspond to adjacent inputs. To state its definition, we define a σ -algebra Σ p overl p , and details for constructing Σ p are in [12] . Differential privacy itself is enforced by a mechanism. Fixing a probability space (Ω, B, P), we formally define a differential privacy mechanism below. Definition 3.2. A mechanism M :l p × Ω →l q preserves ϵ-differential privacy if, for all adjacent inputs u i
This definition encodes the fact that any eavesdropper or adversary is unlikely to learn anything meaningful about sensitive data by looking at differentially private information. The likelihood of such privacy breaches is controlled by the privacy parameter ϵ, which is user-specified. Typical values of ϵ in the literature range from 0.1 to ln 3 [12] , with smaller values providing stronger privacy guarantees. One of the most widely used mechanisms for enforcing Definition 3.4 is the Laplace mechanism, which adds Laplace noise to sensitive data. To define it, we first define the sensitivity of a system. Regarding a causal, discrete-time, deterministic dynamical system as a map G i :l p →l q , we have the following definition.
It is in terms of the ℓ 1 -sensitivity that we define the Laplace mechanism. We use the notation Lap(c) to denote a Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale parameter c:
We emphasize that privacy here is enforced at the trajectory level and customer i's mechanism M i provides a singlẽ ℓ p -valued query that is shared pointwise in time. Unlike other works, these trajectory-level privacy guarantees do not weaken over time because the output at each point in time is not a query of the initial state. Instead, the private output at each point in time merely contributes to assembling a single trajectory-valued query.
Privatizing Customers' Demand Data
We consider customers' power demand trajectories over time to be the sensitive inputs that need to be protected. Thus, while above we have used the symbol u to represent a sensitive input as in the private control literature, we turn now to protecting the trajectories {d i k } k ∈K for each i ∈ [N ]; [12, Lemma 2] guarantees that privacy at the trajectory level also provides privacy to all finite truncations of trajectories, and thus the above definitions apply regardless of the value of K.
We regard customer i's demand signal d i as passing through a memoryless "identity system" whose output is equal to its input. Formally, I d i k = d i k , for all k ∈ K and i ∈ [N ]. We use the adjacency relation Adj b for each system of this kind, and implementing privacy for it then requires a sensitivity bound. This bound takes an elementary form in the following lemma. Proof: For adjacent u i 1 and u i 2 , ∥I u i
which follows from adjacency. ■ The basic form of the sensitivity bound above also gives a simple differential privacy implementation. Theorem 3.6. Let ϵ > 0 and b > 0 be given. The following Laplace mechanism provides ϵ-differential privacy to the i-th customer:
Proof: Follows from Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 and Lemma 3.5. ■ It is understood above that the privacy noise terms added to each customer's data are mutually independent. Since demand data is privatized at each customer's site, the utility has access to only the private data. Any analytics are performed not upon agent i's raw demand value d i k , but instead upon the private demandd i k . The privacy noise impacts the accuracy of analytics performed with this data, and quantifying these impacts is the subject of Section 4. Before doing so, we derive several results we will need in our accuracy analyses.
Technical Preliminaries for Stochastic Processes
As both aggregate demand of a neighborhood and energy use of a single customer involve summing over noisy samples, sums of random variables will appear in the forthcoming analysis. In either case, as long as the sum is over a large number of random variables, we can appeal to the central limit theorem to use a Gaussian approximation. In case of private aggregate demand analysis, the sum will be over consumers while in case of energy use the sum will be over time. The number of summands in either case is finite, and in some cases may be small. To justify a Gaussian analysis, we now introduce a theoretical tool, the Berry-Esseen theorem, which provides a convergence rate for the central limit theorem as a function of the number of summands. 
Over time, various estimates have been made for C, and recent work has bounded it above by 0.4748 for this setting [20] . For simplicity, we will proceed with C = 1 2 . In the problems we consider, each X ℓ is a Laplacian random variable with mean 0 and scale parameter c. Specializing to this case, we have the following result. Proof: The Laplace distribution Lap(c) has variance 2c 2 and third moment 6c 3 . With C = 1 2 , using these values in Lemma 3.7 and bounding the error above by η gives ■ Below we use the term "η-approximately Gaussian" to describe any distribution with error not more than η in the sense of Lemma 3.7. As a concrete example, for b = 2, ϵ = 1, Lemma 3.8 tells us that we need m ≥ 22 for the sum of m Laplace random variables to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. We will later use this bound to show that Gaussian analyses are possible under reasonable assumptions. Lemma 3.9. Let д 1 , . . . , д n be i.i.d. Gaussian, each with 0 mean and variance σ 2 0 . For n ≥ 43,
The variance of the max, for any n, is bounded by var [max 1≤i ≤n д i ] ≤ 4σ 2 0 .
Proof. The mean upper bound can be found in [3, Appendix A], so we prove only a lower bound for the mean. Let S 1 be the event "there exists an i such that д i ≥ σ 0 p log n", and let S 2 be the complementary event "д i < σ 0 p log n for all i". For economy of notation we define the symbol д max = max 1≤i ≤n д i . Then
We lower-bound the right-hand side by noting that
which uses the expectation of the half-normal distribution [13, Equation (3)].
Using the complementarity of S 1 and S 2 , we return to Equation (11) to find
and all that remains is to estimate P[S 1 ]. By definition,
Using the relationship Φ(x ) = 1
Next, using erf(
A simple calculation shows that
if log n log(4n−4) ≥ π 2π −2 , and the first such n is n = 43.
Using Equations (18) and (19) in Equation (16), we then find P f
The right-hand side is decreasing in n, and we take the limit as n → ∞ to derive a bound that holds for all n, giving P f
Using this value in Equation (14) gives
and the mean bound follows from a numerical calculation. The variance bound is proved from the following concentration inequality:
) and var(X ) = E[Z ]. Since Z is a non-negative r.v.,
□ Although the maximum of Gaussian random variables is widely studied, bounds on the mean available in the literature frequently contain unknown constants, e.g., [3, Appendix A] . The lower bound on the mean provided in the Lemma, which we prove below, represents a slight tightening of the best available bound we have found [11] . This bound will be applied below to bound the maximum error over samples in time and the maximum error over customers. Requiring n ≥ 43 is a very mild assumption because it merely requires having at least 43 customers in a power grid or at least 43 samples in a dataset, and both of these conditions are easily satisfied in the vast majority of cases. The bound on the variance is derived from standard concentration inequalities on the maximum of Gaussians, and is likely to be already known, but we were unable to find a reference and thus include the proof here.
We next apply these results to bound privacy-induced errors in smart grid calculations.
ANALYSIS OF DATA ANALYTICS ACCURACY
This section analyzes the impact of differential privacy first upon customers' billing and then upon a utility's data-driven analytics that are informed by private data.
Energy Use/Billing
Recall from Section 2.2 that, when using private data, the error in the estimated energy consumption over a period
An arbitrary customer. We begin our billing analysis by analyzing the impact upon any single customer. The mean error in energy consumption is E[Ẽ i K ] = 0, and this holds irrespective of design choices. The variance is var 2 , which follows from the fact that privacy noise has variance 2c 2 = 2 b 2 ϵ 2 . Since K and ∆t are interrelated, consider a (continuous time) interval τ over which energy use is to be estimated. Since the corresponding number of samples is K = τ ∆t , we have var
The trade-off between privacy and accuracy is apparent from this dependency on b and ϵ: a larger b and smaller ϵ provide stronger privacy (see Section 3), while Equation (22) shows that such a choice leads to higher uncertainty in the energy use estimate, with variance growing quadratically in b and inverse quadratically with ϵ. A related point is the effect of sampling frequency. Since billing is typically done monthly, we can consider τ to be a fixed constant and not a design variable. Eq. (22) shows that the uncertainty in the monthly energy use estimate introduced by the privacy noise can be reduced by using a smaller ∆t, i.e., by sampling the demand more frequently 3 .
Cost of privacy: Let us now consider some numerical values to see how this analysis can drive design of privacy mechanisms. Suppose ϵ = 1 and τ = 30 × 24 hours (representing one month). For ∆t = 1 4 (15-minute sampling), the variance in the monthly energy use is 360b 2 while for ∆t = 1 60 (1-minute sampling), the variance reduces to 24b 2 , in (kWh) 2 . For b = 2, an arguably small value (as we will see in Section 5), the corresponding standard deviations are 37.9 and 9.8 kWh for 15-minute and 1-minute sampling, respectively. The average monthly energy use of residential homes in the USA in 2015 was 1883 kWh 4 , so a standard deviation of 10 kWh might be tolerable for a consumer, though 38 kWh might not be.
The worst-affected customer. Due to the error in the monthly energy use estimate due to privacy noise, a consumer's monthly bill may also be erroneous. Although these errors are 0 on average, even a single instance of a large error may cause large annoyance, and, in certain cases, even financial hardship to the customer. The customer that has the largest error will be the one who is most severely affected. The worst error among a set of customers is a crucial value since it may very well dictate consumer acceptance of the technology by driving public debate. We examine this maximum error next. The maximum error is itself a random variable, so its first and second moments are analyzed.
Specializing the discussion following Lemma 3.8 to the sum that makes upẼ i K , we see that for ϵ = 1 and b = 2, we need K ≥ 22 forẼ i K to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. Even with 15-minute sampling, for a month-long period, K = 2880 ≫ 22, justifying Gaussian analysis ofẼ i K . Theorem 4.1. Assuming the Gaussian approximation ofẼ i K holds, the mean of the maximum ofẼ i K among N consumers is bounded according to
(23) The variance of the maximum ofẼ i K obeys the upper bound var max
Proof. 4.1 As shown before (22) ,Ẽ i K has mean 0 and variance 2K b 2 ϵ 2 [∆t] 2 . The expectation bound follows from Lemma 3.9 with σ 2 0 = 2Kb 2 /ϵ 2 [∆t] 2 . The variance bound follows from the second part of Lemma 3.9.
■ □ Theorem 4.1 allows one to estimate the cost of privacy for customers without going through an expensive data collection process. The bounds only depend on statistics of privacy noise, data sampling rate, and number of customers. We will return to this point in Section 5. 3)) is the error in the aggregate demand of a collection of N consumers estimated from their private demand data at time k. By appealing to the Berry-Esseen Theorem (Lemma 3.7), we can model w k as Gaussian, as long as N is large enough. Again specializing the discussion following Lemma 3.8 to the sum that makes upd k , we see that for ϵ = 1 and b = 2, we need N ≥ 22 ford k to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian, for any k. For any utility, the number of customers is far higher than 22, thus justifying a Gaussian approximation.
Aggregate demand
The mean ofd k is 0 and its variance is σ 2 w k = 2N b 2 ϵ 2 , which follows from the fact that w i k ∼ Lap(c), c = b ϵ , and the variance of a Laplace random variable with scale parameter c is 2c 2 . Therefore, E[d k ] = 0 and var[d k ] = 2N b 2 ϵ 2 . Thus, though the average error is 0, the uncertainty in the error grows linearly with the number of consumers over which aggregation is performed. Theorem 4.2. Assume N is large enough thatd k is approximately Gaussian for all k. Then
The variance of the max, for any K ∈ N, is bounded via
Proof. 4.2 Sinced k = w k , which is a sum of N Laplacian random variables, Lemma 3.9 shows that N ≥ 22 is sufficient to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. w k has mean zero and variance 2Nb 2 /ϵ 2 and the expectation bound follows from Lemma 3.9 with σ 2 0 = 2Nb 2 /ϵ 2 ; the variance bound likewise follows from Lemma 3.9.
■ □ This result shows that on average, the maximum error grows with the square root of the length of time horizon, with variance independent of time. The former is bad news while the latter is good news: peak demand computed over long time horizons may become progressively poorer when it is dominated by the maximum error. The result also reveals the trade-off between privacy and accuracy: larger b will lead to a larger maximum error, as will smaller values of ϵ.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we use high-resolution demand and energy data from a number of residences to illustrate the trade-offs discussed in the previous sections. The data is taken from the Pecan Street Project (from https://dataport.cloud); see [16] for details about the dataset.
Choosing privacy parameters. For numerical investigations reported here, we choose ϵ = log 2, which is within typical ranges for differential privacy implementations [12] . The value of b requires more care since it determines what trajectories will be rendered approximately indistinguishable with the resulting privacy implementation. Choosing an appropriate b depends on the nature of the data and which events are to be masked [12] . We use b = 1 for the numerical investigations to follow. This choice creates a significant difference between the true trajectory and the private one. Figure 2 shows the true demand and its private version created with b = 1 for an arbitrarily chosen home.We can see from the figure that the privacy noise is larger than even the maximum daily demand in many instants.
Maximum error in monthly energy use. Figure 3 shows the numerically estimated mean and variance of the maximum monthly energy use error among N consumers as a function of N , for the month of August 2017. Since the demand data is sampled every 5 minutes, K = 31 × 24 × 12 = 8928. For each value of N shown, we generate samples of the random The masking effects of privacy noise can be seen here in deviations of the private curve from the true one. We emphasize that any postprocessing of these data, such as setting negative values to zero, does not weaken customers' privacy guarantees.
variable Z (N ) max := max 1≤i ≤NẼ i K via random sampling with replacement, as follows. Among the 300 total homes we have data for, N homes (N < 300) are randomly chosen, the error in their energy use estimate over the month is computed (by using true demand and private demand), and the max value is computed among the N samples. By performing this experiment repeatedly, each time choosing a random subset of size N from the total available 300, we obtain samples of the random variable Z (N ) max . The mean and variance of Z (N ) max are then estimated from these samples. Figure 3 also shows the upper and lower bounds on the mean, and the upper bound on the standard deviation, predicted by Theorem 4.1. We see the bounds on the mean are tighter than the bound on the variance. Cost of privacy (again): As in the single/arbitrary customer case, the maximum error in monthly energy use estimate due to privacy can be used to compute a worst-case cost of privacy. In this instance, for a utility with a customer base of 250 households, the average cost of privacy to the worst-hit customer is 43.8kWh/month, which translates to $5.6/month at the current average rate of 12.9/kWh 5 . If one uses "mean plus 3-sigma" to estimate the cost, then it turns out to be 43.8 + 15 = 58.8 kWh/month, or $7.6/month. For a larger customer base, these numbers will increase, but since the growth of the mean is logarithmic and the variance is constant, the increase will be small. These bounds allow us 5 From https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/, second tab. to compute the same worst-case cost of privacy but without having to go through an expensive data collection process on customer demand. Repeating the calculation done in the previous paragraph, but using the theoretical upper bounds obtained in Theorem 4.1, we find an upper bound on the cost of privacy for the worst-hit customer to be $19/month.
Maximum error in aggregate demand. Figure 4 shows the trajectory of the aggregate demand from all 300 homes in the dataset, as well as the private aggregate demand (computed by using the private demand data), for a period of 4 days. Figure 5 shows mean and standard deviation bounds on the maximum error in the private data over time. Both plots indicate that privacy incurs only modest errors with respect to power usage data.
CONCLUSION
We applied trajectory-level differential privacy to demand data from customer smart meters. Because data is made private at the customer's home, any analysis with that data has uncertainty. This includes computing monthly energy use, which is essential for billing. We analyzed the average and worst case errors, and showed that the trade-off between privacy guarantees and analysis accuracy can be translated to a financial cost of privacy to the consumer.
In this preliminary work, we limited our analysis to energy use for a consumer and aggregate demand among all consumers. The peak demand of the aggregate is a valuable quantity for grid planning, and how privacy noise affects the estimate of peak demand remains to be investigated.
